Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Scholarly Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2009

The Magic Circle
Joshua A.T. Fairfield
Washington & Lee University School of Law, fairfieldj@wlu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac
Part of the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Magic Circle, 14 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 545 (2012).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Washington and Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized
administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The Magic Circle
Joshua A.T. Fairfield*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the concept of the “magic circle,” the
metaphorical barrier that supposedly excludes real-world law from
virtual worlds. The Article argues that this metaphor fails because
there is no “real” world as distinguished from “virtual” worlds. Instead
of a magic circle, this Article advocates a rule of consent: actions in a
virtual world give rise to legal liability if they exceed the scope of
consent given by other players within the game. The Article concludes
that although real-world law cannot reasonably be excluded from
virtual worlds, game gods and players can control the interface
between law and virtual worlds through their agreements, customs,
and practices. This leads to a new conception of the magic circle: the
point of interface between community-generated norms and
background law, which often adopts local norms as legal rules.
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Recently, a Dutch court found two young boys guilty of theft of
virtual property after they threatened a classmate with a knife until
he agreed to transfer virtual items to their accounts in the online
game Runescape.1 Commenting on the case, legal scholar Eugene
Volokh stated,
[T]he theft may have been of virtual goods, but it was accomplished through
physical violence in the real world, and against a real person, not an avatar. It’s
clearly proper to prosecute the physical attack and the threats; and I think it’s
sensible to prosecute it as theft as well, since the defendants did take from the
victim something they had no right to take, using violence in the real world. I’d
call this “real-world theft of virtual goods,” not “virtual theft.”
I continue to think that generally speaking the law shouldn’t prohibit purely ingame “theft,” “murder,” “rape,” and so on. But outside-game violence (or even ingame threats of outside-game violence) [is] the proper subject of the criminal law,
including when the violence or threats coerce action or transfer of valuable objects
within the game.2

The difficulty of maintaining any bright line between “in-game”
and “outside-game” acts was demonstrated two days later. A Tokyo
woman, angered when her virtual romance in the world of MapleStory
ended in virtual divorce, logged on to her erstwhile virtual husband’s
account and deleted his avatar.3 He complained to the police, and as
of this writing, she is in police custody.4 The action was virtual, and
the harmed avatar was virtual—but the act had legal repercussions in
the real world.
I do not intend to single out Volokh—I wrote most of this
Article before he made the comments above. However, his statement
provides an excellent example of the persistence of a legal metaphor,
generally termed the “magic circle,” which has dogged our ability to
understand how the law impacts virtual-world communities. The
magic circle is the supposed metaphorical line between the fantasy
realms of virtual worlds and what we consider to be the real world.5
The purpose of the magic circle is to protect virtual worlds from
outside influences—law, real-world economics, real-world money, and
1.
See Jacqueline Carver, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE, Oct. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/region /netherlands/081022-virtual-theft-isreal.
2.
See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, Dutch Youths
Convicted of Virtual Theft, available at http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_10_192008_10_25.shtml#1224695366 (Oct. 22, 2008, 13:09 EST).
3.
See Mike Musgrove, Tokyo Woman Jailed for Avatar “Murder,” WASH. POST,
Oct.
23,
2008,
available
at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2008/10/
tokyo_woman_jailed_for_avatar.html?nav=rss_blog.
4.
Id.
5.
See Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 200-05
(2004) (describing the concept of the magic circle).
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the like. The thrust of the magic circle metaphor is that actions that
occur within virtual worlds are not real, and thus cannot be
sanctioned using real-world law.6 Following this reasoning, real-world
law is appropriately left out of virtual worlds.
This Article seeks to debunk the magic circle. The thrust of my
argument is simple: There is no “real” world as distinguished from
“virtual” worlds. Rather, all supposedly “virtual” actions originate
with real people, and impact real people, albeit through a computermediated environment.7 As a result, the distinction between a
“virtual” act and a “real” one is not helpful. This Article advocates
replacing the magic circle with a rule of consent. What matters is
whether the action taken—be it a bite in a boxing match, a blow to the
head in football, or a theft of virtual property—is within the scope of
consent of the other players.8
Part I of this Article will examine the concept of the magic
circle and the reasons it has gained traction within online
communities. Part II will discuss the reaction of the legal community
to prior claims of legal separatism by online communities, including
the Internet cybersovereignty debates of the 1990s. Part III will
develop a framework for future interactions between real-world law
and online communities. This new model will not depend on claims of
online sovereignty or on claims that what happens in virtual worlds is
not “real” but will instead build on an analysis of legal consent,
community self-regulation, and legal recognition of community norms.
Finally, the Article will draw a new magic circle: instead of arguing
that the law cannot touch virtual worlds, this Article will argue that
virtual worlds may be able to generate community norms usable by
real-world courts as a source of legal rules.
I. FANTASY, PLAY, AND THE MAGIC CIRCLE
Before evaluating the magic circle as a legal metaphor, it is
useful to understand why the metaphor has proven so durable in
virtual worlds. This section discusses some of the reasons why the
6.
7.

Id. at 201-02.
See EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE
OF ONLINE GAMES 159 (2005) (“[W]here exactly is the line between game and life? . . .
Imagine if someone were to insist on the following rule: if a rabbit attacks [a player] and I
help him by casting a spell, we are ‘in the game,’ but if we are not actually interacting with
the synthetic world, but rather only with each other, then we are ‘in life.’ . . . Our culture
has moved beyond the point where such distinctions are helpful.”).
8.
See, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979)
(establishing the traditional rule that intentional violence outside of the scope of consent is
an actionable tort).
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magic circle metaphor has gained recognition and respect within the
virtual-world community.
Protecting virtual play is the first function of the magic circle.9
When people play, they often act out scenarios that would be illegal if
performed in the real world.10 In video games, for example, players
might kill each others’ avatars. An actual murder charge will not be
brought when one avatar kills another within a game dedicated to
such mayhem. This makes sense: children often play games (for
example, cowboys and indians) that represent real-world tragedy, but
if society were to prosecute children simply because of the subject
matter of their games, they would stop.11 The play is not “real,”
proponents of the magic circle argue, and thus law does not regulate
it. However, there is a problem. As discussed below, if a player
departs from the rules of the game and injury results, the law may
intervene.12
The second function of the magic circle is to protect stories and
speech.13 In virtual worlds, players telling fantasy stories can act
them out without repercussions like actors on a stage. Just as in the
theatre, some stories cannot be told without discussing violence or
sexuality. In works of fiction, characters commonly engage in illegal
acts. Likewise, movies or theatre productions sometimes include
depictions of sex or violence that may fall outside the realm of social
and legal acceptability. Yet the authors of those plays, books, or
movies are not themselves liable for the illegal actions of their
characters. Indeed, the artistic expression of acts that would be
against the law if actually performed is protected by the First
Amendment.14 There are books about murders, but no one advocates
prosecuting these authors for murder. As part of our conception of
what it means to be human, we value the ability to tell stories about
the worst acts of humankind without fear of prosecution. Tales about
sex and violence have traditionally been protected by our free-speech
9.
See, e.g., Castronova, supra note 5, at 188 (“For Huizinga, nothing can be a
game if it involves moral consequence. Whatever is happening, if it really matters in an
ethical or moral sense, cannot be a game.”) (discussing JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A
STUDY IN THE PLAY-ELEMENTS IN CULTURE (1938)).
10.
In the controversial Grand Theft Auto series, for example, players are allowed—
even encouraged—to run over pedestrians and beat up prostitutes in addition to the game’s
namesake crime of stealing cars.
11.
See Castronova, supra note 5, at 188.
12.
See, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
13.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (holding the Child Online
Protection Act unconstitutional for burdening adult access to protected speech).
14.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down a
ban on the virtual depiction of child pornography as violative of the First Amendment).
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jurisprudence even though those actions, if actually performed, are
not.15
The third major function of the magic circle is to protect what
is known as a “start over,” a “level playing field,” or a “clean slate.”16
There is a media-influenced perception17 that some players of virtual
worlds are not successful in the real world, and thus deeply desire a
new life in a new world. Therefore, it is important to some players
that they get an even playing field to begin their virtual lives anew.
Even if one rejects the standard media characterization of gamers as
young or losers (and I think we must, since studies show that gamers
are older and more successful than most had assumed),18 the level
playing field remains an important concept in virtual play.19 Nobody
wants to play a game in which the results are skewed in favor of one’s
opponent from the very beginning.
Thus, the basic conception of the magic circle within the
virtual-world community includes the following elements: protection of
spaces for play, tools for narrative, and the chance to build a new life.
Note that this Article does not take issue with these goals, but rather
the accuracy and efficacy of the legal metaphor currently advanced to
achieve them. As detailed below, virtual communities do not gain any
protection by claiming that their actions are not “real” and thus not
subject to legal sanctions.

15.
See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (holding that a book
describing the life of a prostitute is not constitutionally obscene.); see also Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (plurality opinion) (“[M]aterial dealing with sex in a manner
that advocates ideas or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of
social importance, may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional
protection.” (internal citation omitted)).
16.
See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Worlds: A Primer, in THE
STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 13, 15 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone
Noveck eds., 2006); see also Posting of Elizabeth Harper to WoW Insider,
http://www.wowinsider.com/ (Feb. 20, 2008) (“We've taken the approach that we want
players to feel like it's a level playing field once they're in [World of Warcraft]. Outside
resources don't play into it—no gold buying, etc.”).
17.
See South Park: Make Love, Not Warcraft (Comedy Central Network television
broadcast Oct. 4, 2006) (making fun of one particular World of Warcraft player who had no
life and became too powerful, even for the game gods).
18.
See, e.g., The Entertainment Software Association – Industry Facts,
http://www.theesa.com/facts/index.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (reporting that 26
percent of Americans over the age of 50 play video games and the average age of a gamer is
35).
19.
See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 22 (explaining that every EverQuest
player begins at the relatively weak “Level 1” and must level up to play most of the game).
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II. CYBERSOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAGIC CIRCLE
A second conception of the magic circle is advanced by lawyers
and academics rather than players. Claims that the magic circle
protects virtual worlds from the incursions of real-world law mirror
the claims of cyberseparatism that were advanced in the mid-1990s.
The core of the cybersovereignty debate was the tension between
cyberseparatist assertions that cyberspace was immune to regulation
by real-world governments due to conflicts between sovereigns,20 and
cybernationalist claims that national sovereigns could regulate online
communities without any special need for new jurisprudential tools.21
This section examines the literature of cybersovereignty, asserts that
apologists from both sides have failed to capture the essentials, and
proposes a better framework for understanding the reasonable and
desirable relationship between law and virtual worlds.
Legal academics interested in cyber-regulation began by
arguing about whether or not governments could enforce their laws
across borders. David Post’s “Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace” argued that the problems inherent in extraterritorial
enforcement of national laws were such that governments could not
regulate internationally.22 Jack Goldsmith’s “Against Cyberanarchy”
responded with some vim that cross-border law enforcement was no
more difficult in the age of the Internet than under prior
telecommunications regimes, and that nation-states were perfectly
capable of unilateral regulation of online communities.23 Goldsmith’s
later work cataloged the fragmentation of the Internet into nationstate intranets (such as China’s largely separated space) and argued
that the nationalization of cyberspace was largely inevitable and
desirable.24
Cyberseparatists and their cybernationalist interlocutors have
largely talked past one another. Cyberseparatist arguments are

20.
See, e.g., Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the
World of Internet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 605, 618 (2003) (summarizing the
cyberseparatist doctrine as wanting to protect cyberspace from social norms and
governance).
21.
See id. at 613 (“Traditionalists do not respond to this extreme portrayal of
unfettered regulatory overlap in cyberspace by denying the theoretical problem of
regulatory spillover effects.”).
22.
See David R. Johnson & David Post, Laws and Borders – The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
23.
See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
24.
See Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, Digital Borders, LEGAL AFF., Jan.Feb. 2006, at 40, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February2006/feature_goldsmith_janfeb06.msp.
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largely normative and cybernationalist arguments are, for the most
part, descriptive. Cyberseparatists deny the power of governments to
make law that affects online spaces25 while cybernationalists
inadequately address the negative consequences of national regulation
of online communities.26 Yet nation-states do affect online spaces
through the enforcement of laws that impact their citizens.27 This is
certainly true of virtual worlds, because such worlds tend to be largely
congruent with national borders. Even transnational phenomena,
such as World of Warcraft, tend to be subject to national governance
because servers are typically located in or near the countries of the
majority of players.28
On the other hand, cyberseparatists note, with some
legitimacy, that national power is at its lowest ebb when it attempts to
regulate fantasy games, both because games have traditionally
enjoyed some self-regulatory deference from courts, and because
exercises of creativity and imagination ought to be freed from
government oversight.29 Thus, cybernationalists argue that nationstates can indeed regulate virtual worlds because servers and citizens
are close at hand while cyberseparatists argue that nation-states
should not interfere with virtual worlds because such worlds are
largely fantasy.
As the debate stands, cybernationalists have largely carried
the day on descriptive grounds, but they have failed to provide much
of a normative basis for their theories. Governments can clearly affect
online communities by passing and enforcing applicable laws—but
cybernationalists have not demonstrated that such laws will be better
or more effective than the customs and norms already in use within
online populations.
This Article argues that the debate is at a standstill today
largely because the parties began with the wrong question.
Sovereignty debates are, at best, tangential to cyber-regulation. The
25.
26.

See Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 20, at 612.
See id at 613 n. 35; see also Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 1201 (“It does not
argue that cyberspace regulation is a good idea, and it does not take a position on the
merits of particular regulations beyond their jurisdictional legitimacy.”).
27.
See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF
A BORDERLESS WORLD 65-85 (2006).
28.
World of Warcraft, for example, has servers located in the United States,
Europe, and China. For a listing of current server locations, compiled by the gaming
community, see Realms List-WoWWiki, http://www.wowwiki.com/Realms_list (last visited
Mar. 20, 2009).
29.
See, e.g., F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crimes, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 293, 294 n.5 (2004) (“[T]alk of a thick cyberspace sovereignty is really convincing only
when talking about MUDs, videogames, and other exercises of fantasy . . . .” (quoting Tim
Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1199-1202)).
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fundamental issue of online regulation is not the balance of power
between nation-state sovereigns.30 Rather, it is the balance between
sovereign and citizens.
Governments must decide how much
regulation of citizens’ online activities is appropriate and effective and
citizens must decide how much government interference they will
tolerate.
The focus on nation-state sovereignty has caused academics to
overlook other more promising solutions. Online communities do not
need sovereignty in order to benefit from some degree of self-rule.
Many groups are able to gain some access to legal rules, and to court
enforcement of those rules, without benefit of separate legal
sovereignty.31 For example, industry customs and practices often
create default legal rules that courts draw upon in regulating those
industries.32 Through the law of contract, private agreements can
have the force of law.33 The regular course of a business often sets a
legal standard.34 Even the rules of a game can have the force of law:
bite your opponent in a boxing match or cheat in a Las Vegas poker
game and legal consequences will follow.35 Punch someone in a boxing
match, or bluff in a poker game, and all is well.

30.
See Doreen Carvajal, French Court Tells eBay to Pay for Counterfeits, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01
/technology/01ebay.html.
31.
See Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private
Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 203,
243 (2007) (“Traditional dichotomies between hard and soft law, informal and formal,
public and private, and even law and non-law begin to break down leading to a form of
legal hybridity. Law-making and enforcement are created by a diverse range of private and
public actors including governments, NGOs, corporations, and private regulatory bodies
that sometimes work together to formulate policies and regulate themselves, and each
other, both within and without the framework of the state.”) (emphasis in original).
32.
See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984)
(applying the knockout rule such that “[t]he ultimate contract . . . includes those nonconflicting terms and any other terms supplied by the [Uniform Commercial Code],
including terms incorporated by course of performance (§ 2-208), course of dealing (§ 1205), usage of trade (§ 1-205), and other ‘gap fillers’ or ‘off-the-rack’ terms”).
33.
Although the use of contracts to create mass public rules does have limits, see
generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of
Virtual Worlds, 54 MCGILL L. J. 427 (2008).
34.
See L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs., Inc., 17 F.3d 106 (5th Cir.
1994) (supplanting a contract term definition with the common industry definition); see
also Stender v. Twin City Foods, Inc., 510 P.2d 221, 225 (Wash. 1973) (“The definition . . .
must be determined in light of reasonable industry custom and usage . . . even though
words in their ordinary or legal meaning are unambiguous.”).
35.
Boxer Mike Tyson, for example, lost his boxing license, was fined $3 million,
and was ordered to pay legal costs after biting off a portion of Evander Holyfield’s ear in a
1997 fight. See Mike Downey, Commission Didn’t Pull Any Punches, L.A. TIMES, July 10,
1997, at C1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1997/jul/10/sports/sp-11287.
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Legal commentators have overlooked a lot of this kind of
community-based law because of the misplaced focus on sovereignty.
In an effort to correct this oversight, the remainder of this Article
examines community norms and player consent in virtual worlds as a
potential source for real-world legal rules for virtual worlds.
III. DRAWING A NEW MAGIC CIRCLE
For players who wish to see online communities set their own
rules, all is not lost. It seems unlikely that real-world nations will
recognize online communities as separate and coequal sovereigns. But
it is likely that real-world courts will seriously consider the norms
generated by online communities as courts take up the task of
applying law to virtual worlds. This section discusses several ways in
which the rules generated by online communities might gain legal
force and effect. The section argues that the relevant inquiry is not
whether actions are “real” or “virtual,” but whether a given action falls
outside the parties’ scope of consent.
A. The Rules of the Game
Game rules are created by the intersection of at least four legal
sources: contractual end-user license agreements (EULAs) drafted by
game gods (the companies that create and maintain virtual worlds),
community-negotiated norms, player consent, and background laws.
Since consent in both the contract and torts sense is a core concept in
determining how these sources combine to create law, this section will
discuss consent in games in detail.
When a player consents to a game by clicking through a
contract, she agrees to a package of contract terms whether or not she
is familiar with each one.36 Although these terms may be in the form
of rules, they are in fact contractual promises, made by the player to
the game god. In addition, players agree to conform their actions to a
common set of expectations in the torts sense; these expectations can
be formally generated (as in the Monopoly ruleset) or informally
generated (as in a game of touch football).37 Actions outside the rules
36.
See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–02
(1941) (describing role of contract doctrine in informing parties that they are about to
undertake binding legal relations).
37.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 cmt. b, illus. 5 (1965) (illustrating that
even breaches of the rules of the game—such as an offside tackle—are still within the scope
of consent of the game); see also, e.g., McAdams v. Windham, 94 So. 742 (Ala. 1922)
(boxing); Gibeline v. Smith, 80 S.W. 961 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904) (tussling); Vendrell v. Sch.
Dist. No. 26C, Malheur County, 376 P.2d 406 (Or. 1962) (football tackle).
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and also outside the scope of player agreement thus run the risk of
being sanctioned by background law.38
One caveat in defining consent: I have previously written about
why the model of informed consumer consent to individual contract
terms is not useful in mass-market transactions.39
Consumers
understandably do not read contracts and the cost of conveying a
specific piece of information through the terms of a contract is often
greater than the benefits that the information conveys.40 Thus, when
this Article discusses contractual consent, it refers to blanket consent
to EULA terms as a package rather than informed consent to each
term.
Further, the consent discussed here has a broader meaning
than purely contractual consent. Some claims sound in contract;
others sound in tort. In the tort formulation, when one plays a game,
one agrees to the rules established by the game community, not just
the rules written by the game manufacturer. Monopoly may not be
intended as a drinking game, but with a few tweaks of the rules by the
community it can become one; the scope of consent given by the player
changes to match the variant of game negotiated by the community.
Football may be tackle, flag, or touch, depending on the decision of the
community, and the scope of player consent varies accordingly.
Unlike contractual notions of consent, in the tort formulation a
breach of game rules may still be within the players’ consent to the
game. 41 A football tackle that is offside is against the rules, but it is
within the scope of the expected behavior in the game. As such, injury
resulting from a tackle that is only improper because it is offsides is
not actionable.42 There is a spectrum of allowable behavior: if
something is technically outside the rules but within the scope of
consent, then it will not yield legal liability.
Instead of asking what is “real” or “virtual,” lawyers examining
actions related to virtual worlds should ask who has agreed to what

38.
39.

See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Contract, __ EMORY L.J. __ (forthcoming 2009).
40.
Id.
41.
The closest contract analogy might be waiver or modification. If party A violates
a contract term, and party B takes no action the first several times, there is an argument
that B has agreed to change the parties’ agreement.
42.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 cmt. b, illus. 5 (1965) (“A, a member
of a football team, tackles B, an opposing player, while he, A, is "offside." The tackle is
made with no greater violence than would be permissible by the rules and usages of
football were he "onside." A has not subjected B to a violence greater than, or different
from, that permitted by the rules, although he is guilty of a breach of a rule. A is not liable
to B.”).
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and with whom. In a legal conflict between player and game god, the
contractual EULA provisions might well prevail.43 For example,
suppose that a player used off-color chat in a public chat channel in
“The Barrens,” an area within the virtual world World of Warcraft
that is well known for rough-and-tumble language. In a player/gamegod dispute, a court might decide that the game god was well within
its contractual rights to ban the player from the game.
However, if player A sued player B for off-color chat in the
Barrens, the court may well turn to community norms instead of the
EULA. (It might be especially likely to do so if it determined that the
EULA is a promise between each player separately and the game god,
not between player A and player B.)44 Such a court might decide that
by continuing to listen to Barrens public chat (players have the option
to mute chat channels if they do not wish to hear them), player A
consented to a more rough-and-tumble standard of language. Blue
chat clearly violates the EULA terms. But some amount of rulebreaking is expected in any game and off-color chat is likely included
within the scope of consent that governs what players may say vis-àvis each other.45
Additionally, players may consent to activities beyond both the
scope of the EULA and community standards. For example, EULAs
forbid hacking into other players’ accounts, and community norms
agree.46 Thus, hacking another player’s account is likely to sound both
in contract and in tort (and, for that matter, in criminal law). In other
situations, EULAs and community norms may not align. EULAs
forbid sharing accounts between players,47 but community norms do
not agree. As a result, individual players share account information
all the time. If I share my account information with someone else,
that person is not liable to me for accessing the account, either under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, for unauthorized access of my

43.
See, e.g., Complaint, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, LLC, No.
SACV07-0589 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2007), available at http://virtuallyblind.com/files
/in_game_dollar_complaint.pdf; see also Consent Order, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game
Dollar, LLC, No. SACV07-0589 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2008), available at
http://virtuallyblind.com/files/Peons_Injunction.pdf (shutting down defendant’s business
that engaged in systemic EULA violations).
44.
See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of
Virtual Worlds, 54 MCGILL L. J. 427 (2008). Cf. Michael Risch, Virtual Third Parties, 25
SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L. J. 415 (2009).
45.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 cmt. b.
46.
See World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, § 2(B)-(C),
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/eula.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
47.
See id. § 6.
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system, for conversion, or for any of a number of other common law
theories.48
EULAs create game-god/player legal obligations and
simultaneously propose rules for adoption as community norms.49
Separating these functions permits us to understand why EULAs
strongly impact community norms and yet are not the sole source of
law in virtual worlds. Instead, EULAs interact with community
norms, individual consent, and background law to generate legal
outcomes.
This analysis opens the door for a new understanding of how
legal rules operate within virtual worlds. Whether or not an action in
a virtual world gives rise to a viable cause of action depends on the
scope of consent granted between each set of parties. Rights will
change depending on the relationship between the parties. For
example, the virtual property problem has foundered on the
assumption that virtual property must be treated the same in the
relationship between game god and player as it is in the player-player
relationship. Many EULAs claim that no player has ownership rights
in virtual property.50 However, claims between players are still
adjudicated by courts across the world as if such rights did exist.51
The state of the law at this moment is, essentially, that virtual
property rights do not run against game gods but do run against other
players. This is not surprising—it is possible to have a contract with
the game god that does not affect legal rights between one player and
another. Under this approach, between game god and player, the
property will be treated as owned by the game god, but if one player
steals another player’s virtual property, legal liability will result.
Under the old conception of the magic circle, such a result
makes no sense: either virtual property is “virtual,” and interests in it
are utterly unprotected by law, or it is “real” and fully protected
against all comers. Under the new conception articulated by this
Article, players in virtual worlds are real, the actions are real, and
even the digital objects of their actions are real. The critical question
is not whether the property is real or not, or whether a theft of
48.
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). Like the common law
action of trespass, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act requires access of a protected
computer without authorization in order to give rise to a cause of action; this requirement
certainly would not be met if I willingly gave account access to a friend.
49.
Indeed, Second Life has incorporated a “Community Standards” list into its
Terms of Service. This list, while broad, can be changed at the request of the Second Life
community. See Second Life Community Standards, http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php
(last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
50.
See World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, supra note 46, § 3(A).
51.
See, e.g., Carver, supra note 1.
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property is real or virtual, but whether a given act as relates to the
property is inside or outside the scope of consent of the parties. As
between the game god and the player, the EULA may clearly indicate
that the god may alter or delete a given digital object at will. But as
between players, one player’s theft of another’s property may well
exceed the scope of consent and thus be actionable in fraud or
conversion.
Some thought experiments may help to cement this distinction.
If person A threatens person B in the real world, that action is subject
to the sanction of law.52 But what happens if A attacks or threatens
B’s virtual avatar? The old conception of the magic circle would
dictate that an attack on an avatar is not actionable under real-world
law. However, varying the hypothetical slightly demonstrates that it
does not matter whether an action is in-world or outside-world, but
rather whether the A’s action is outside of B’s scope of consent. If A
takes an in-world action that is outside the scope of consent—for
instance, if A threatens B’s avatar in a way that makes B feel
personally threatened—then A’s in-world action will be subject to realworld civil and criminal sanction.53
A critic may respond that such an action is, in essence, a realworld action since A’s threat was directed at B, a real person. While
true, this demonstrates that the sharp distinction between real and
virtual worlds has already begun to blur: real people can still harm
one another through actions outside of consent through the medium of
a computer. A further example blurs that barrier into non-existence.
In some games, player-versus-player combat is a feature of the game.
In such a game, if player A pulls out a virtual knife and stabs B’s
avatar, the action is utterly pedestrian and non-actionable. However,
suppose instead that A attacks B’s avatar by hacking B’s account and
deleting B’s avatar. This form of attack subjects A to criminal
penalties.54 The difference is that both players have consented to
player-vs.-player combat as part of playing the game. Hacking,
however, is not part of the game, and thus the action is measured by
background, default, real-world law. In each case, the action is virtual
and the object is virtual, but hacking falls outside the scope of consent

52.
53.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21-34 (1965).
The law makes no distinction between the method of communication, only that
A threatened B and that B felt threatened. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-308(a)
(2009) (allowing a cause of action for threats made via telephone).
54.
See Musgrove, supra note 3.
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and is subject to real-world legal sanction, whereas player-vs.-player
combat is part of the game.55
Consider the example of the Dutch boys that began this
Article.56 They were convicted of theft of virtual property.57 It is
irrelevant whether the theft of virtual property was accomplished by a
real world action or a virtual-world action. Certainly the out-of-game
nature of the physical confrontation between the boys underscored the
fact that the theft was outside the scope of any possible consent
granted by the victim.
But it is not hard to construct a
counterexample in which a physical confrontation that is within the
rules of a game would not be actionable. So-called “alternative reality
games” intentionally cross the boundary between virtual and real
environments. Many alternative reality games include a significant
component of physical confrontation—nothing on the order of pulling a
knife, but there is an undeniable physical component. So it is not the
nature of a game as “real” or “virtual” that determines whether or not
violation of the rules yields legal liability—again, it is whether the
action of the player exceeds the scope of consent granted by the other
players.
Law in virtual worlds hinges in large part on the consent of
players in the “real” world. Virtual-world law has been dominated by
industry-drafted EULAs58 and, as such, the concept of players
determining law is a bit of a novel concept. This should not be the
case: EULAs derive what authority they have directly from the
agreement of the players to their terms.59 This is hardly rocket
science, but remembering the role of consent in games vastly
simplifies the legal issues affecting virtual worlds. Note too that the
opinion of the community also matters. Norms within virtual worlds
are not usually negotiated on a person-to-person basis (though
55.
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, for example, such an action would
likely be deemed an intent to defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
56.
See Carver, supra note 1.
57.
See id.
58.
See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008
WL 2757357, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008) (“Use of [World of Warcraft] is governed by [a
EULA] . . . and [a] Terms of Use Agreement.”); Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.
Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding the relevant agreement provisions controlling, but
unconscionable); see also Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual
Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 429 (2008).
59.
As the EULA is a contract, it requires the same basic elements taught in any
first year contracts class: offer, acceptance, and consideration. It only gains power and
enforceability when the user accepts and consents to its provisions. See, e.g., ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Following the district court, we treat the
licenses as ordinary contracts accompanying the sale of products, and therefore as
governed by the common law of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code.”).
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exceptions to the norms are typically negotiated individually).
Instead, the judgment of the community sets the baseline. For
example, if a group decides to play tackle football, then each
individual player has presumably consented to being tackled.
Individual negotiations (“no hitting in the face!”) then occur in the
shadow of that community norm. If players can give consent, they can
then modify that consent on a case-by-case basis. If player A begins a
sexually explicit conversation with player B in a club in Second Life,
player A may soon find that the conversation crosses his boundaries.
He can withdraw his consent to further conversation, even though he
consented to—and even initiated—the original conversation.
There are limits to this consent-based approach. For example,
it is important to ask whether one can consent to a certain activity at
all. For example, many virtual worlds are highly sexualized and there
is a culture among gamers that can make female players deeply
uncomfortable.60 Although it is possible to say that the community
norm is to overtly sexualize women, it is impossible to argue that
female players have consented to sexualized treatment merely by
entering the world. In this case, a more important real-world norm
may well trump the in-world community norm.
This interaction between community expectations and
individual consent generates a large number of real-world legal rules
that have true force and effect in online spaces. The scope of consent
defines the relationship between the laws of the real world and actions
in virtual worlds and, therefore, any conception of the magic circle
that excludes real-world law from virtual worlds does not seem
accurate. A new conception of the magic circle, which permits players
and game gods to define the terms by which law enters virtual worlds,
would be more accurate and useful.
B. A Case Study: Money and the Magic Circle
The interaction between money and the magic circle deserves
special mention, since it is the intrusion of real-world dollars into
virtual worlds that precipitated the current spate of virtual-world
litigation. Game gods use the metaphor of the magic circle to justify
blocking real dollars from entering virtual worlds, in order to protect

60.
See generally Mitch Wagner, Sex in Second Life, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 26,
2007, available at http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/hosted/showArticle
.jhtml?articleID=199701944 (describing the rise and prevalence of sexualized behavior in
Second Life).
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play and preserve the level playing field.61
Yet even a brief
examination of the consent principle shows that this traditional
understanding is erroneous. Many virtual worlds, both those that are
games and those that are not, operate using microtransactions.62 To
obtain goods or services within the virtual world, one must pay with
real-world cash. Further, economics plays a direct role in computer
hardware, which has a direct impact on the game experience. It
seems odd that the magic circle would block software upgrades by
blocking the purchase of virtual property or game accounts for cash,
but not block upgrading ones computer to get a significant advantage.
The question is not whether real-world economics can or should
impact virtual worlds; they can and they should. The question is how
much of an impact the players can expect. Is buying a high-quality
tennis racket considered unfair in tennis? Do the New York Yankees
cheat the League by having a player payroll nearly five times that of
the current American League champions, the Tampa Bay Rays?63
Typically, these questions are decided by their respective
communities. I would say that high-end hardware and fast internet
connections are considered completely fair by the gaming community,
despite the serious advantage that such technology gives to the
owners who are willing to invest in it, whereas purchasing a magic
sword or an upgraded account is subject to serious debate.
Here, I should expose my personal bias. I believe that the basic
exchange of money for time is a bedrock facet of real-world culture.
No one complains that I did not build my house for myself. No one
complains that I did not assemble my truck by hand. No one even
complains when I buy a precision-tooled set of golf clubs. And yet
there is a complaint when I ask someone else to create an avatar or an
account in a virtual world to my specifications. I think we should
question that disparity. It would be considered very strange in our
capitalist society to eliminate our ability to trade money for what we
61.
See MDY Indus., LLC. 2008 WL 2757357, at *1 (“Blizzard claims that Glider
upsets this balance by enabling some payers to advance more quickly and unfairly,
diminishing the game experience for other players. Blizzard also contends that Glider
enables its users to acquire an inordinate number of game assets—sometimes referred to
as ‘mining’ or ‘farming’ the game—with some users even selling those assets for real money
in online auction sites, an activity expressly prohibited by the [terms of use].”) (internal
citation omitted).
62.
See Eric A. Taub, HDTV Is a New Reality for Game Developers, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 2005, at C12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/16/business
/16game.html (“Microsoft hopes to earn additional revenue through an increase in
microtransactions, as players purchase game elements such as weapons and tattoos for a
few cents each.”)
63.
See CBS Sports, MLB Salaries, available at: http://www.cbssports.com
/mlb/salaries.
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want. Accordingly, the idea that virtual worlds can survive only by
wiping out both private property and the exchange of money for other
people’s time seems suspect.
The argument that play cannot survive the intrusion of realworld economics does not appear entirely accurate. Instead, the best
that one can say is that the norm within some communities is to
accept upgrades to both hardware and software; and the norm of other
virtual worlds is to permit hardware upgrades but not software
upgrades. That is, it is the expectations of the players—either the
imported expectations of a capitalist society or the nascent
expectations of game players themselves—that determine whether or
not private property exists within virtual worlds.
Indeed, it is difficult to overestimate the impact of player
expectations on the legal treatment of virtual property. Regardless of
EULA provisions, courts worldwide have chosen to treat virtual
objects as personal property for the purposes of resolving criminal
complaints brought by one player against another.64 Again, the
example of the Dutch boys is instructive. The Runescape EULA
indicates quite clearly that players do not own the virtual objects they
earn through game play.65 If one were to take the EULA as the sole
source of operative law, then the perpetrators would have taken
nothing from the victim. Yet the Dutch court—as is typical of courts
worldwide—chose not take that approach.66 This is also the approach
taken by South Korea, which has codified a similarly complex set of
expectations in statutory form. Under South Korean law, virtual
property may not be bought or sold commercially, but it may be
exchanged between non-merchant individuals for in-world trade or
currency.67 Additionally, theft of virtual property is a criminal offense.
This Article does not advocate any particular solution to the
problem of the interaction of real-world economics with virtual worlds.
I use it here to make two points: first, that it is impossible to separate
virtual worlds from the economics of the real world; second, that

64.
See, e.g., Will Knight, Gamer Wins Back Virtual Booty in Court Battle, NEW
SCIENTIST, Dec. 23, 2003, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4510-gamer-wins-backvirtual-booty-in-court-battle.html (discussing a Chinese case where the court ordered the
Internet service provider to replace virtual items that had been hacked and stolen).
65.
RuneScape Terms and Conditions, http://www.runescape.com/terms/terms.ws
(last visited Mar. 19, 2009) (“You agree that all intellectual property or other rights in any
game character, account, and items are and will remain our property.”).
66.
See supra note 1.
67.
Korea’s “Act of the Promotion of Game Business,” Chapter 2, 32-(1)-7, forbids
commercial trading of virtual items, yet recognizes the private fun of individual trades if
not done commercially.
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consumer expectations can be a powerful source of law for virtual
worlds.
IV. CONCLUSION
Several points are worthy of reemphasis. The individuals who
enter virtual worlds are real, their actions within those worlds are
real, and the effects of those actions on other people are real. Thus, it
is implausible to say that virtual worlds are not subject to real-world
law, since real consent given by real people is the very source of law in
virtual worlds.
It is likely that courts will increasingly look to standards
developed by virtual communities and that those community
standards will come to have the same force and effect as real-world
industry customs in creating real-world law. The first steps have
already been taken: courts have not been shy about applying basic
contract and tort law to virtual worlds.68 As the real-dollar value of
virtual-world assets grows, courts will not hesitate to apply real-world
criminal law to virtual worlds.
The implications for the future of virtual worlds are complex.
On one hand, denizens of virtual worlds should hope that the law that
ultimately governs virtual worlds will not only take their interests
into account in a paternalistic fashion, but also that courts will give
the actual solutions worked out by online communities the force of
law. On the other hand, players in virtual worlds should understand
that their behavior online is not entirely free from real-world scrutiny.
This is a bit saddening. It was wonderful to live in the cyber Wild
West. However, every new frontier has its civilizing moments. And
virtual worlds are an enormous phenomenon that the law cannot
afford to ignore.

68.

See supra note 58.

